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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE DEREGULATION OF TELEVISED COLLEGE
FOOTBALL: The National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Board of Regents
Most colleges and universities in the United States that en-
gage in intercollegiate sports are members of the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA).1 In 1951 the NCAA estab-
lished a television committee to develop a television plan for the
1951 football season. This committee exercised complete control
over televised college football games and until 1977 its control re-
quired the approval of all NCAA members.2
In 1977, the television committee obtained approval to control
a number of principles of negotiation. These principles provided a
basis for the NCAA to negotiate with television networks for fu-
ture television contracts. Since that time, without obtaining ap-
proval from its membership, the NCAA negotiated contracts with
networks that departed from the previously approved principles.3
1. Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D.
Okla. 1982), affd, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), a/Pd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). The NCAA
was founded in 1905 as a vehicle for promoting and organizing intercollegiate athletics on an
amateur basis. It establishes policies and rules that govern its members' participation in
various sports, and exerts regulatory controls, some economic in nature, over its members.
The NCAA has over 800 members. They are classified into separate divisions according to
the size of their athletic programs. Division I includes the major college football powers and
has 276 members. Division I is further subdivided into Division I-A which consists primarily
of the largest institutions and Division I-AA which consists of those institutions with
smaller athletic programs. Divisions II and III consist of yet smaller colleges numbering
around 500.
2. Id. at 1283. From 1952 until 1977 the NCAA Television Committee followed a pro-
cedure for approving the television plan which included circulating a questionnaire to all
NCAA members to obtain input as to how much control should be exercised by this plan. A
leading feature of this process was that every NCAA member voted by a mail referendum to
approve or disapprove the plan. Id.
3. Id. at 1283. Until 1977, television contracts were for one or two years. In 1977, the
NCAA signed a four year agreement with the American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
granting it exclusive rights to broadcast college football games during the 1978-1981 seasons.
The plan under attack in NCAA was adopted in 1981 and granted similar exclusive rights
for the 1982-1985 seasons to ABC, the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and Turner
Broadcasting System (TBS) (for live cablecast). One feature of the plan allowed each school
to appear on television no more than six times during two seasons for a pre-set fee deter-
mined by the NCAA. Id. at 1291-93.
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The College Football Association (CFA), which consists of a
number of NCAA football conferences and schools, did not agree
with the terms of the television plan that the NCAA adopted in
1981 to cover the 1982 through 1985 seasons.4 The CFA felt that
its members did not have a proportionately adequate voice in de-
veloping the television plan because all 800 NCAA members, most
of which did not play football, voted.5 Because of overall dissatis-
faction with the NCAA's lack of response to the CFA's concerns, it
investigated the possibility of negotiating its own television agree-
ment with one of the networks. On August 8, 1981, the CFA con-
tracted with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) for the
rights to televise football games for the 1982 through 1985 football
seasons.6 The NCAA reacted to the CFA's new contract by an-
nouncing that those CFA members choosing to abide by the new
NBC TV package would be in violation of NCAA rules and would
be disciplined accordingly. On September 8, 1981, the University
of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia, both members of the
CFA and the NCAA, filed an action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma to prevent the NCAA
from initiating disciplinary proceedings or otherwise interfering
with the CFA's efforts to perform its agreement with NBC. The
court granted temporary injunctive relief on September 8, 1981.
Ultimately, the CFA/NBC contract was not consummated because
most of the CFA members chose to opt out.7 Dispute continued
between the CFA and NCAA subsequent to the injunctive action.
At the NCAA special convention, the CFA's concerns remained
unresolved.8
4. Id. at 1285. The CFA consists of the Big Eight, the Southeastern, the Southwestern,
the Atlantic Coast, and the Western Athletic conferences, as well as the major independent
football powers like Notre Dame, Pittsburgh, Miami and Florida State. It was their position
that each school should appear on television as many times as the market could bear.
5. Id. Prior to 1971, an annual resolution of the membership was the source of the
television committee's authority. In 1971, the NCAA adopted Bylaw 11-3-(aa) which read:
"The [Football Television] Committee shall be responsible for the formulation and adminis-
tration of the Association's football television policy and program, subject to the approval of
the membership." Id. at 1284.
6. Id. at 1286. The contract that the CFA negotiated with NBC was similar to the
types of contracts that the NCAA had previously negotiated with other networks. This con-
tract, however, allowed for more appearances on television by each school and called for
higher fees to be paid to each school. The contract was approved by a vote of the CFA
members on August 21, 1981: 33 members voting in favor, 22 against and 8 not voting.
7. Id. at 1286. Few CFA members were willing to commit to this new plan. It appears
that the threat of NCAA sanctions was a major consideration in the CFA members' decision
not to participate in the NBC contract. The 1981 football season therefore proceeded under
the NCAA contract with the ABC and CBS television networks.
8. Id. at 1287. At the NCAA's special convention held in December 1981, at the re-
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Following a non-jury trial, the district court found that the
NCAA exercised monopoly power over the college football televi-
sion market, that the football controls constituted a horizontal
agreement among competitors to fix prices and restrict output, and
that the controls constituted a group boycott. Consequently, the
court held that the NCAA had violated the Sherman Act.9 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed and
held that the NCAA television plan constituted illegal per se price-
fixing.10 On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States
held, affirmed: The NCAA's television plan violates section one of
the Sherman Act. National Collegiate Athletic Association u.
Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
The prohibitions of the Sherman Act (Act), were never stated
in precise and clear language. 1 The words of the Act itself shed
little light on what the makers intended the Act to cover. 12 If read
literally, the Act outlaws every agreement that restrains competi-
tion.13 Such an interpretation would be intolerable because any
productive unit, no matter how small, incorporates a tacit agree-
ment to eliminate some competition."
The courts have interpreted the general rule under the Act as
quest of the CFA to consider a restructuring of the organization, the CFA complained that
Division I-A included many schools whose football program were less extensive than those
of CFA members. The CFA believed that Division I should be restructured to reduce the
numbers of schools in Division I-A (Division I consists of about 276 colleges with major
athletic programs, less than 190 of which play football). Several CFA members proposed the
creation of a new division composed solely of major football playing schools but this propo-
sal was rejected. A proposal was adopted, however, that reduced the schools in Division I-A
from 135 to 95 schools. The annual NCAA convention held in January, 1982, likewise did
not satisfy the CFA's complaints. At the annual convention the membership adopted an
amendment to the Bylaws that purported to establish the propriety of the NCAA controls
and ratified the NCAA proposal for the television package for the 1982 through 1985 foot-
ball seasons. Id.
9. Id. at 1276. The court found that free market competition had been restrained in
three ways: (1) the NCAA fixed the price for individual telecasts; (2) the exclusive network
contracts were equivalent to group boycotts of all other potential broadcasters because the
threat of sanctions against its own members constituted a threatened boycott of potential
competitors; and (3) that its plan placed an artificial limit on the production of televised
college football.
10. Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.
1982), a/i'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
11. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 473 (1940).
12. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads in part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
13. Id.
14. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L. J. 775 (1964), (pt. 2), 75 YALE L. J. 373 (1965).
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directed at two types of practices that hurt competition: 1)
"[a]greements by which consenting parties remove some or all of
the competition existing or likely to exist between themselves" and
2) "practices by which one or more parties injure competitors, and
thereby injure the competitive process itself."15
From this general principle, the courts developed the concept
that certain contracts were, on their face, unreasonably in restraint
of trade, or per se illegal."6 This resulted in court decisions that
rendered illegal agreements which otherwise appeared basic to the
day-to-day operations of any economy. 17 Per se illegality rests on
two foundations. One, that in all but a small percentage of the
cases the anticompetitive harm of the practice outweighs any of
the benefits; and two, that any judicial attempt to identify cases in
which the practice is not harmful will waste time and add uncer-
tainty to the law."8
Next came the judicial analysis known as the Rule of Rea-
son.' Under this analysis an agreement purportedly in violation of
the Sherman Act is examined first from the standpoint of what the
parties intended and second as to the effect of the agreement.10 It
has been stated that in a larger sense, there is only one test - the
effect of the agreement.21 Justice Brandeis articulated a clear defi-
nition of the Rule of Reason in Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States:"
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
15. Bork, supra note 14, (pt. 1) at 775.
16. 104 S. Ct. at 2962. Although numerous definitions of per se illegality have been put
forth since the adoption of the Act, Justice Stevens in NCAA deems per se to be applicable
"when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anti-competitive conduct so great
as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct." Id.
17. See United States v. Addyson Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898),
afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
18. Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L. J. 655,
665 (1978).
19. The earliest articulation of the Rule of Reason was by Justice Peckham in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), where he stated that the Rule
of Reason outlawed those agreements whose purpose and effectwas to suppress competition
in the general market but to uphold those whose elimination of competition was collateral
and incidental to another end the parties were pursuing.
20. In Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Justice White recognized that
the Sherman Act prohibited classes of activities broad enough to encompass every conceiva-
ble contract and that as a result courts were to perform an economic analysis in order to
determine which activities or contracts presented a monopoly. This rule of reason deter-
mined whether the statute was violated.
21. Bork, supra note 14, (pt. 2) at 388.
22. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion. To determine that question the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good inten-
tion will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the re-
verse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.2 3
Nevertheless, the Act has never been thought to be applicable
to nonprofit organizations. Its thrust is purely commercial. The Act
seeks to prevent restraints to free competition in business and
commercial transactions.2 4 Initially, it appeared that the Sherman
Act did not apply to the practice of the liberal arts or the learned
professions.2 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia articulated this "traditionally noncommercial" doc-
trine in 1970. The court there held that enterprises normally hav-
ing other than commercial objectives do not invoke antitrust laws,
and a circumstance of "incidental restraint of trade, absent an in-
tent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects of the profession,
is not sufficient to warrant application of the antitrust laws."'26 The
justification given for allowing the anti-competitive practices of
nonprofits is that they correct a market failure and are the least
anti-competitive alternative available. 27 Under this doctrine the
courts rejected antitrust attacks on a number of nonprofits includ-
ing the NCAA.25
The Supreme Court, however, soon made clear that it did not
intend to grant a blanket exemption for nonprofits. In the
landmark case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,2' the Supreme
23. Id. at 238.
24. In Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), the Court stated that the Act was applicable
only to a limited extent to organizations that have noncommercial objectives.
25. If per se illegality appeared to be an elusive concept as applied to the business
world, it was even more difficult to grapple with when applied to a nonprofit entity. This is
especially confusing since the law does not contain a statutory exemption for nonprofits.
26. Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n. of Colleges and Second-
ary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
27. Note, Antitrust and Non-Profit Entities, 94 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1981).
28. In Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975), the court rejected an anti-
trust challenge by an athlete negatively affected by eligibility rules. The court reasoned that
these rules were designed to promote amateurism and that the resulting restraint on trade
was incidental to this legitimate goal.
29. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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Court refused to exempt learned professions from the antitrust
laws. The Court held that price fixing by the Bar Association was
illegal under the Sherman Act. It stated that "the nature of an
occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the
Sherman Act" where anticompetitive activities or practices are al-
leged. 30 The essence of Goldfarb is that anti-competitive activities
are subject to antitrust actions regardless of the context in which
they occur. 31
Shortly thereafter, in Hennessy v. NCAA, 2 the court rejected
a challenge to an NCAA Constitution Bylaw that restricted the
number of assistant football coaches a school could hire. Hennessy
was significant because the court refused to grant a blanket exemp-
tion to the NCAA. It chose instead to hold the Sherman Act appli-
cable and then apply the Rule of Reason.
A succession of significant cases marked the Court's new direc-
tion in its analysis of nonprofits. In National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States," the Court held as per se ille-
gal an engineering association's cannon of ethics that prohibited
competitive bidding by its members. The Society had claimed that
competitive bidding would tempt engineers to do inferior work
that would threaten public health and safety. 4 The Court stated
that the ban on competitive bidding prevented a potential cus-
tomer from price shopping in the open market.35 The Court went
on to argue that the Rule of Reason does not open the field of anti-
trust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint."
Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on
competitive conditions.3
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,8 the Court held that an AS-
CAP39 blanket license for use of copyrighted musical compositions
did not constitute price fixing forbidden by the Sherman Act.4 0 An
30. Id. at 787.
31. Id. Justice Burger left open the possibility, however, that other anti-competitive
practices by a learned profession might not be deemed illegal if they survived the Rule of
Reason analysis.
32. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
33. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
34. Id. at 693.
35. Id. at 695.
36. Id. at 688.
37. Id.
38. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
39. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
40. ASCAP and Broadcast Music, Inc. acted as clearinghouses for copyright owners
and sold blanket licenses in which they gave licensees the right to perform any of the musi-
cal compositions of the owners in return for a fee.
[Vol. 2:79
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arrangement by which copyright clearing houses sold performance
rights to their entire libraries on a blanket rather than individual
basis did not warrant condemnation on a per se basis. Individual
licensing would have allowed competition between copyright own-
ers. Licensing on a blanket basis yielded substantial efficiencies
that could otherwise not be realized. The blanket license was to
some extent a different product because potential buyers of the
music could still deal directly with the individual composer and
negotiate a better rate.
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y.,4' the Court
held that maximum fee agreements, even within the context of a
nonprofit association, are per se illegal under the Sherman Act be-
cause they constitute price fixing. The Court stated that for the
sake of efficiency, courts have invalidated some agreements that a
full scale investigation might have proved to be reasonable.42
These three cases, together, laid the foundation for the state
of the antitrust laws as applied to nonprofits at the time of the
NCAA decision. It was essentially that although no across-the-
board statutory or judicial exemptions were granted,'43 nonprofits
were generally thought to come under the Act, but their anti-com-
petitive activities could be justified under a Rule of Reason analy-
sis. 4 NCAA is significant because it stands for the proposition that
if a nonprofit entity enters the market place and conducts activi-
ties that in any other context would be those of a business for
profit, the Sherman Act will be applied to it in the same manner as
it would be applied to a private profit-making entity.
In NCAA, the Court reasoned that an analysis must be carried
out under both the per se rules and the Rule of Reason. To that
end, the Court did not find that the television plan was illegal per
41. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). Two medical societies in Arizona established nonprofit foun-
dations for promoting a fee-for-service practice. Among other things, the foundations set the
maximum fees that participating doctors agreed to accept as payment in full for their
services.
42. Id. at 344.
43. Congress can and has exempted a number of the industries from the full reach of
the Sherman Act. E.g., Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291 and 292 (1922) (agricultural
cooperatives); McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1013 (1945) (insurance); Telecast-
ing of Professional Sports Contests Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1966) (football, etc.); 15
U.S.C. 9 1801 (1970) (Newspaper joint operating agreements); Reed-Bulwinkle Act, 49
U.S.C. 9 5b (1978) (rail and motor carrier rate-fixing bureaus).
44. In Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc. v. ABC, 499 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Ohio
1980), the court rejected a request for a preliminary injunction against the NCAA regulation
restricting the number of college football telecasts. Although the court found the existence
of a horizontal agreement to restrict output, it refused to find it to be illegal per se because
it occurred in other than a commercial setting.
7
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se. The Court observed that this case involved an industry in
which some horizontal restraints on competition were essential if
college football was to be available at all.45
The Court conducted a three part analysis based on market
power, 46 the pro-competitive justification for the restrictive activ-
ity, and the possibility of achieving the same objective through a
less restrictive means. The Court established the market power of
the NCAA with respect to its product; it rejected the NCAA's ar-
gument that it could not otherwise obtain competitive prices for its
games because broadcasters would seek less expensive alterna-
tives.'7 The Court concluded that the television plan operated as a
restraint on the free market and that the NCAA must justify its
anti-competitive behavior under the Rule of Reason.
The Court then determined that the NCAA plan produced no
pro-competitive efficiencies. It found that unlike Broadcast Music,
where the joint selling arrangements assisted in the marketing of
broadcast rights in a competitive market, the NCAA plan only acts
to stifle competition because it does not permit the individual
school and other broadcasters to negotiate openly for the sale of
the product. The Court then concluded that no pro-competitive
justification exists and that the plan operates to raise price and
reduce output, ignoring consumer preference.4" The NCAA Court
distinguished Broadcast Music because in that case, in addition to
the joint selling arrangements, the composers and the potential
buyers were free to negotiate in the open market. The Court relied
on Professional Engineers to reject the NCAA's argument that the
plan protected live attendance at games. The Court rejected this
argument because it rests on a premise that competition is unrea-
sonable - something which the Rule of Reason cannot support."
Finally, the Court asserted that if, as the NCAA claimed, one
45. 104 S. Ct. at 2961.
46. Id. at 2965. The Court analyzed market power despite its assertion that absence of
market power is not sufficient justification for a restriction on price or output.
47. Id. The Court agreed with the district court in finding that college football attracts
its own unique audience and that competition would be unable to offer other programs to
attract this audience.
48. Id.
49. Hochberg & Horowitz, Broadcasting and CATV: The Beauty and the Bane of
Major College Football, 38 LAw & CompMP. PRoas. 112 (1973). In 1972, fewer than 50 of
3,000 college games'played were available for home viewing. No more than 19 games were
telecast in most viewing areas. Viewer choice was restricted to games chosen for them. Id. at
112. The author concluded that the NCAA plan resulted in higher broadcast revenue for
most colleges and eliminated competition between rival telecasts. Id. at 127.
50. 435 U.S. at 696.
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of the goals of the television plan was to promote balance among
teams, there were other restrictions which the NCAA already im-
posed that were better suited to this goal and less restrictive of
competition." The Court noted that no other NCAA sponsored
sport contained a similar restriction." In other major sports, for
example basketball, a balance has been maintained without resort
to such restriction.55
The Court concluded that the district court was correct in its
finding that many more games would be televised in an open mar-
ket situation." It added that the restrictions of the plan were not
consistent with the role of the NCAA to promote college sports
and that the NCAA plan "restricted rather than enhanced the
place of intercollegiate athletics in the nation's life."5 5
Justice White's persuasive dissent noted that the majority's
analysis focused too intensely on the business aspects of the case
and neglected the fact that the NCAA and its members are non-
profit institutions of higher learning.5 He argued that the purpose
of the regulation was to prevent the powerful institutions from be-
coming even more powerful at the expense of lesser known
schools.57 In his analysis however, he glossed over the economic im-
plications of the NCAA plan. Justice White's different view of the
record would accord legitimacy to the NCAA's argument that the
television plan promoted balanced competition.58 Relying on Gold-
farb, Justice White argued that:
The legitimate noneconomic goals of colleges and universities
should not be ignored in analyzing restraints imposed by as-
sociations of such institutions on their members, and these non-
economic goals 'may require that a particular practice, which
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently.'"
Justice White stressed that the noneconomic goals sought by col-
leges and universities differ fundamentally from those pursued by
engineers, lawyers, and doctors." He argued that any anti-compet-




55. Id. at 2971.
56. Id. at 2972.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2979.
59. Id. at 2978.
60. Id.
9
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itive practices resulting from the television plan are offset by the
broader more noble goal of having athletics "supplement rather
than inhibit educational achievement."6
His strongest argument is that the NCAA has no monopoly
power against other types of entertainment because, if the quality
of the games declined, viewers would turn to some other form of
entertainment.2 He concluded that the NCAA's product belongs
in the broader category of general entertainment rather than in
the unique category of college football.
The Court's decision rested on an economic analysis, applying
the Rule of Reason to a nonprofit organization. While recognizing
that in this context neither party was operating like a nonprofit
entity,63 it did not articulate any new method for applying the
Sherman Act to nonprofits. It merely continued in the tradition of
the Rule of Reason analysis. The phrasing of the holding supports
the district court's finding that by imposing production limits on
their product and restricting the independence of its members to
negotiate independently, the NCAA achieved an artificially high
price for its product." The Court reaffirmed that in a free market
economy, which is the hallmark of this nation's ideology, products
are best marketed in a non-restrictive competitive arena. In apply-
ing this decision to other instances involving nonprofits, attorneys
and courts must be mindful that the attack on the challenged ac-
tivities came from within the organization itself. It is questionable
whether the Court would have reached a similar result had the
plaintiff been one of the television networks.
Ralph Gonzalez
61. Id. at 2979.
62. Id. at 2977.
63. Although NCAA members are nonprofit institutions, they engage in activities with
respect to televised football that are for the most part indistinguishable from those of their
profit-seeking competitors. Note, supra note 18. The district court noted that the plaintiffs
were not "seek[ing] money damages in lieu of profits they could realize under reduced com-
petition". 546 F. Supp. at 1303. Rather, they sought to "increase their profits in a truly
competitive situation". Id. In this sense, the plaintiffs had profit as a motive for their ac-
tions and the NCAA sought to frustrate their goals.
64. Taaffe, A Supremely Unsettling Smorgasbord, 65 SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5,
1984, at 151. During the 1983 football season, ABC and CBS, under the NCAA television
plan, paid $62.5 million for the rights to televise college football. In 1984, under the "der-
egulated" system, they planned to pay approximately $20 million.
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